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LIBERALIZED AGRICULTURAL TRADE -- AT THE MULTILATERAL 
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, BILATERALLY OR NOT AT ALL! 
By Ambassador Clayton K. Yeutter 
Annual Meeting 
Western Agricultural Economics Association 
Ft. Collins, Colorado 
July 20, 1976 
For most of the 20th century, much of the world has 
fretted about agricultural surpluses. This has been parti-
cularly true of the major producing nations, with the 
United States being in the forefront. Only a decade ago, 
our "ever normal granaries" were bursting at their steel 
seams, and we were immersed in another agonizing appraisal 
of U.S. farm policy. 
Then the shock came! In 1972 everything went wrong 
on the production front droughts, early frosts, monsoon 
problems, even the fish meal supply diminished because of 
an uncooperative ocean current. We suddenly realized that 
man was not quite as omniscient as he thought, especially 
in the field of weather control. And the Soviets realized 
that they had a demanding consumer sector, even under a 
totalitarian regime. All of this caused reverberations 
throughout this planet of ours, and the "world food problem" 
was born. Attention turned from surplus disposal programs 
to concern over production and access to that production. 
The basic question, of course, is "Can the world con-
tinue to feed itself?" It is not my purpose to answer that 
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query here, for it is a question the scope of which goes far 
beyond the arena of international trade policy. 
One factor, however, is so simple as to be often over-
looked. At any given point in time, we ought to do the best 
we can with what we have! In other words, with a finite 
quantity of agricultural products available, or about to be-
come available in the short run, those products should move 
in international trade to where they are most in demand. The 
principle of comparative advantage should establish short 
run production patterns, and the rules of international trade 
should facilitate the distribution of that production in re-
sponse to competitive market forces. 
An oversimplified model, such as the one I have just out-
lined, obviously does not describe the real world. It is easy 
to rationalize departures from the model, particularly if one 
is philosophically uncommitted to a market oriented economic 
system in the first place. The temptation of government inter-
vention has been irresistible in many nations, including some 
which are in dire need of expanded food production. As a con-
sequence, these nations have often ended up with agricultural 
production disincentives, rather than incentives, in their 
system. This has been a tragedy for their people, for the 
rules of distribution and trade are meaningless if there is 
little to distribute or to export. 
As economists, we should do all we can to point out 
the probable economic repercussions of departing from well 
established economic principles. This applies, of course, 
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to domestic production and marketing policies, an area in 
which economists have usually had a good bit to say, and at 
times considerable influence. But it also applies to inter-
national trade policy, an area in which economists have 
traditionally been much less active, and of relatively limited 
influence. Therefore, I would like to concentrate today on 
(1) international trade policy in the agricultural sector as 
it now exists, (2) efforts that are underway to alter the 
international trading system, and (3) some contributions that 
agricultural economists might appropriately make to that 
alteration. 
Th~ •eduction and Elimination of Trade Barriers 
If the basic objtH::tive of the principle of comparative advan-
tage is even to be approached in the real world, it is impera-
tive that barriers to agricultural trade be reduced and, where 
feasible, eliminated. Increased agricultural production is of 
limited usefulness in feeding the hungry of the world if it 
cannot move freely across national borders. Yet, though this 
is well understood, barriers to agricultural trade continue 
to proliferate. In many cases, nations have become more, 
rather than less, protectionist in recent years. They have 
become highly imaginative in their approach, adding a gamut 
of non-tariff barriers to the tariffs that have been with us 
for centuries. 
Why do they do this in the face of palpable starvation 
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in certain parts of the world, and in direct contradiction 
to the interests of their own consumers? As usual, the 
reason is part economic, part political. Some domestic 
agricultural sectors are often in a price depressing surplus 
situation., even when aggregate food stocks are at dangerously 
low levels. This has been true, for example, in the dairy 
industry •Of many countries in recent years, even though grains 
have been in short supply. Beyond that, agricultural interests 
are politically strong in many countries, especially in the 
developed world, even though their numbers have diminished 
dramatically with the technological revolution. In some, 
farmers hold the balance of political power, thereby wielding 
an exceJ!)tional degree of political influence. 
As a result of all this, domestic agricultural interests 
frequently seek -- and obtain protection from the agricul-
tural exports of other nations. When they are non-competitive 
internationally (as is true, for example, for much of the 
small scale agriculture of the European Economic Community), 
they battle vigorously for that protection, because their 
survival is at stake. 
Trade Barriers Erected for Defensive Purposes 
The first element of agricultural trade restrictions 
is thus defensive in nature, oriented to keeping exports out. 
For many years, this was done through tariffs. But the 
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effectiveness of tariffs as a protective mechanism has waned 
during the past three decades. This is due to the half dozen 
rounds of trade negotiations that have been conducted under 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the GATT), with 
tariff levels having been progressively lowered during these 
negotiations. The GATT has helped move the principle of 
comparative advantage a bit closer to reality though, unfor-
tunately, with less success in agriculture than in the 
industrial sector. 
As domestic industries, both agricultural and non-agri-
cultural, in the U.S. and elsewhere have observed the progres-
sive crumbling of tariff protection, other protective mechanisms 
have been devised by their governments. One must give reverse 
''credit" where it is due; they have done this very effectively 
indeed. So-called "non-tariff barriers" have become the major 
impedient to world trade today. Whereas the previous rounds 
of GATT negotiations dealt almost exclusively with tariffs, 
with non-tariff barriers scarcely even being mentioned, the 
present Tokyo Round of negotiations probably will devote far 
more time to the latter than to the former. It must do so if 
substantial progress is to be made. 
What are all these non-tariff barriers, and what are we 
seeking to do about them in Geneva? Let's take the major 
ones on an individual basis. 
The first, of course, is quantitative restrictions, quotas 
if you will. We in the U.S. have them in dairy products, and 
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to a lesser extent in meat. Both programs have been vigorously 
attacked in Geneva. Other nations have even more restrictions 
of this nature. Though Japan is our best agricultural customer, 
it has a multitude of QRs, including a program on meat that was 
at least partially responsible for forcing us into our own 
voluntary restraint program. The European Economic Community 
li~wi~~ has numerous quantitative restrictions, along with 
its variable levy system. And the lesser developed countries 
have moved heavily to quota programs, typically rationalizing 
them on balance of payments grounds, or for "safeguard" pur-
poses, i.e., •to. protect infant industries. 
From an economist's viewpoint, a quantitative restriction 
is one of the most disconcerting trade barriers of all, for it 
flies directly in the face of competitive forces. What good 
does it do to become more efficient than anyone else in wheat 
produ£::tion, e.g., if one can sell only "X" bushels in a given 
market irrespective of price considerations? Yet this is 
the situation faced by many of our competitive agricultural 
industries (and the competitive industries of many other 
countries as well), all to protect relatively less efficient 
agricultural producers of importing nations. Perhaps one can 
rationalize a certain production level of basic food products 
in any country, even though that production be uneconomic 
and violative of the principle of comparative advantage. 
Political and possibly even national security considerations 
ntay predominate in such a case. But this too should be kept 
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in perspective by policy makers. Does a goal of "total self-
sufficiency in rice" really make sense in Japan? Partial 
self-sufficiency, perhaps; but total self-sufficiency, one 
must wonder! At the very least, the economists of Japan, the 
United States, or any other country should point out to their 
policy makers the opportunity cost of such decisions. 
Quantitative restrictions form one of the major areas 
of effort now underway in the Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
in Geneva (the Tokyo Round). So far, we have had notifica-
tions and discussions on a bilateral basis between and among 
the 90 nations that are participating. We are not yet at the 
negotiating stage, even bilaterally, and far from it on 
devising any multilateral solutions to this problem. But 
we need to work at it with vigor, lest we conclude the nego-
tiations with little progress in this distortive area of 
international trade. 
The European Community has resisted the inclusion of 
variable levies in the Geneva deliberations of the Quantita-
tive Restrictions Group. It has, in fact, resisted their 
inclusion in the deliberations of any of the basic functional 
MTN groups, notwithstanding their obvious effect on interna-
tional trade. 
Variable levies are among the most frustrating trade 
barriers of all, particularly to the U.S. and other exporters 
as they seek to establish markets in the Community and in other 
nations which use them. The essence of the variable levy is 
that when world market prices fall, the levy automatically 
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increases. This makes it essentially impossible for an ex-
porting country to expand its sales even though market condi-
tions would ordinarily provide that thrust. The positive 
impact on sales that should result where import demand is 
not completely inelastic is negated by the variable levy. 
This not only frustrates the competitiveness of a given 
country, such as the U.S., but it also shifts -- in a 
distortive way -- the burden of market adjustments. The in-
ternational market for a given commodity becomes "thinner," 
for those nations which apply the variable levy isolate them-
selves from the impact (or at least the full impact) of supply 
and demand conditions elsewhere. Though their market remains 
relatively stable, price fluctuations elsewhere become greater 
than would otherwise be the case. This occurred, for example, 
as the world sought to adjust to the severe drought in the 
U.S. Corn Belt in 1974. The price of feed grains rose dramati-
cally in the U.S. and in most parts of the world. U.S. live-
stock and poultry producers suffered through severe financial 
losses and ultimately adjusted by altering the grain content 
of their rations, reducing feeding periods, and in some cases 
even closing down their operations. It was a major adjustment 
on our part, and one reason was that nations th variable 
levies did not share in that adjustment. Feed grain usage 
in the European Community changed very little during that 
period and, in fact, its mountain of dairy surpluses continued 
to rise. 
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Variable levies have a cost, to the world trading community 
as a whole since they are a flagrant departure.from the principle 
of comparative advantage, and particularly to those nations 
who are forced to absorb the world's supply and demand adjust-
ments. But they also have a cost to the consumers of the 
nations which use them. Their proponents argue that they pro-
vide stability. That they do, but it is the worst possible 
kind of stability for a consumer! In terms of food costs, 
variable levies simply remove the valleys, and leave the con-
sumer with nothing but peaks! That, unfortunately, is the 
lot of EC consumers, and will be until they achieve a stronger 
political presence than they have today. 
Import licenses, import deposits, customs regulations, 
customs valuation procedures, and minimum import prices all 
have many of the distortive features of quantitative restric-
tions. Sometimes they are even more troublesome, for the 
restrictiveness is difficult, if not impossible, to prove. 
In licensing, for example, licenses just do not seem to be 
issued! Or, if they are issued, it is after an inordinate 
delay -- usually at about the time the product is no longer 
in season in the exporting country! Administrative procedures 
can be exceptionally time consuming when someone has a vested 
interest in their being so. 
Import deposit schemes obviously have a cost. Money 
is not interest free, and the cost of a deposit must be borne 
by someone in the marketing process. 
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Customs regulations can be as frustrating as import 
licensing. At times, it takes a long while for all those 
forms to be completed and stamped. With perishable products, 
they seem to be completed just as the product has "perished." 
Finally, valuation procedures can add an unexpected cost 
to imports as well. One would assume that the invoice price 
would be used as the base for customs valuation procedures, 
but this is often not the case. One of our neighbor countries, 
for example, uses "official prices" on many imported goods,, and 
these prices often are considerably higher than the invoice 
amount. 
All of these practices are presently being scrutinized 
in a Customs Subgroup in Geneva. Hopefully progress will be 
made to minimize their impact on international trade. In 
particular, changes in this area are contributions that the 
less developed countries could and should make to the MTN. 
Even standards, whose basic purpose is to foster trade, can 
be and are used to impede it. About two years ago Canada banned 
the import of U.S. beef, allegedly because we then permitted our 
cattle feeders to use diethylstilbestrol as a feed additive. 
DES significantly increases weight gains in fattening cattle, but 
there is evidence that it may also have carcinogenic properties 
under certain conditions. Hence, the Canadian standard pre-
sumably was designed to protect the health of its consumers 
of beef. USDA, however, responded to the Canadian situation 
by implementing a series of surveillance and other measures, 
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the purpose of which was to insure that U.S. beef entering 
Canada would not contain DES residues. Eventually the Canadian 
government recognized the effectiveness of these measures. 
Within a few hours of doing so, they implemented a highly 
restrictive quota program on U.S. beef! One must wonder just 
how relevant health considerations were in the original ban. 
A similar situation occurred recently involving U.S. 
citrus exports to Japan. The Japanese government abruptly 
banned imports of citrus which had been treated by either of 
two particular fungicides, even though both had been approved 
for use by Codex Alimentarius, an international standards 
body of which Japan is a member! This case is still under 
negotiation today. 
Fortunately, we appear to be making progress on the 
standards front in Geneva. A good deal of work has been done 
over the past two or three years, and hopefully a procedural 
code will reach fruition in 1977. This code will not establish 
standards; its purpose is to provide a set of rules that are 
to be followed by nations (or other entities such as Codex 
Alimentarius) in the standards making process. The basic 
intent is to obtain an open and transparent procedure, so 
that those affected will have an opportunity to comment on 
a proposed standard before it is implemented rather than 
after. In too many countries that is not now the case. 
Other nations are much less inclined to be as open in the 
conduct of their regulatory and regulatory-related programs 
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as we are. 
Government procurement practices have many of the same 
restrictive features as standards making. That is, the basic 
problem is that procurement practices are not open. A 
foreign company rarely is the winning bidder on government 
procurement contracts. In some countries, foreign firms 
have a difficult time even learning about the contracts until 
after they are awarded. And it is often impossible to deter-
mine the amount of the winning bid. In other words, "buy 
national" programs work very successfully in most nations! 
This is not now a major problem for agriculture, but it can 
become one as more governments around the world become in-
valved in the purchase of agricultural commodities. (In one 
of our major trading partners, for example, single tendering 
/i.e., negotiating with only one bidde~7 is permitted for pro-
curement of any product sold on a commodity exchange. The 
economic rationale of that provision is difficult to fathom!) 
The hope here is also to negotiate an international code. 
Work in this area has been underway in the Organization of 
Economic Cooperation & Development (The OECD) for more than 
a decade, so far with limited success. But a negotiating 
group will be formed in Geneva on the subject later this year, 
and it will be able to build on the OECD experience. There 
is a reasonably good chance that a government procurement 
code can be completed in 1977. 
The final defensive mechanism worthy of mention is the 
traditional tariff. Though less restrictive in an era of 
floating exchange rates than has heretofore been the case, 
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it can still be important with certain products and in cer-
tain countries. The U.S. has few tariffs of any consequence 
in the agricultural area, but other countries do. 
The European Community, fearful that its valuable levies 
might be construed as tariffs, was successful in limiting the 
tariff cuts of the Kennedy Round in the mid-60s to industrial 
cuts. They did this by keeping agriculture separated from 
industry in the negotiations, with the U.S. ultimately dis-
covering that it had little trading stock in agriculture. 
Hence, nothing much happened. 
The Community is following precisely the same tactics 
in the Tokyo Round; early this month they placed their pro-
posed tariff formula on the table in Geneva, and it deliber-
ately excluded agriculture. This time, however, U.S. nego-
tiators are determined that an industrial-agricultural sep-
aration will not occur. In this they have the strong backing 
of the entire U.S. agricultural community, the Congress, our 
agricultural advisory committees, and the Trade Act of 1974 
itself. The agricultural "give" in the Kenned.y Rc::n:tnd!l w\ils 
primarily by the U.S.; we are determined that this will 
not be the case in the Tokyo Round! 
So much for defensive actions which nations take to 
protect their farmers from international competition. As 
can readily be seen, there are a host of restrictive devices 
in use for this purpose. We can only hope that significant 
progress can be made in Geneva to reduce the number and im-
pact of these measures. If this can be accomplished, we 
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will have moved the world a lot closer to an orientation of 
competitive agricultural markets, with a substantial compara-
tive advantage characterization. 
Trade Measures Taken for Offensive Purposes 
Nations can and do take offensive actions to protect 
and benefit their farmers too. The classic example is the 
export subsidy. In this area, economists are somewhat 
ambivalent, unsure as to whether such subsidies should be 
welcomed, tolerated, or condemned. Developing countries, 
for example, argue that export subsidies are essential, at 
least in the short run, if they are ever to become competi-
tive. This is the infant industry principle or modifications 
thereof. Economies of scale may be necessary for a nation 
to achieve competitiveness in the exportation of a given 
agricultural product. This may, so the argument goes, re-
quire both import restrictions and export subsidies; other-
wise the market volume necessary for competitive pricing will 
never materialize. 
The developing countries have a number of additional 
arguments in favor of their use of subsidies -- structural 
differences, e.g., along with terms of trade issues. 
Other nations argue that they have a stronger social 
orientation than export competitors like the United States. 
Exporting firms must pay their share of the cost of these 
domestic social programs. Therefore, subsidies are required 
to offset the competitive disadvantage that would otherwise 
occur to exporters in these socially oriented countries. 
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I will not debate these issues today. Suffice it to 
say that if the above and other arguments supporting export 
subsidies have any validity in economic theory at all, that 
validity is primarily, if not entirely, limited to the developing 
nations. I am not persuaded that export subsidies can be justi-
fied in the context of international trade among the developed 
countries. And they certainly cannot be justified in predatory 
circumstances, and where abuse of basic economic principles is 
flagrant. 
In the European Economic Community, export subsidies are 
the flip side of the Common Agricultural Policy coin; variable 
levies being the other side. With its inordinately high price 
support levels, the CAP must use variable levies to limit 
competition from imports. And it must use export subsidies 
to rid itself of the surpluses that are inevitably generated 
when support levels become inordinately high. Without those 
subsidies, the Community would find international price 
competition in agricultural products to be very tough indeed. 
We have used export subsidies of our own in the past --
and for the same reason the Community uses them today! We 
permitted our support levels to get too high, and we priced 
ourselves out of the world market. We became residual 
suppliers and, as you will all remember, there wasn't much 
residual demand in the '60s! 
Fortunately, we began in 1965 to alter our farm policies, and 
we completed that job in the farm programs that were enacted 
by the Congress in the early '70s. That series of legislation 
put us back into the world market -- where we should have been 
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all the time,given the efficiency of U.S. producers! I hope 
we will never again repeat the policy errors of earlier 
decades. Should we be tempted to do so, we ought simply to 
observe the struggles of western Europe's farmers today. 
High price supports are deluding them, just as they deluded 
us some years ago. 
Recently, for example, the EC made a sale of wheat to 
Brazil, a traditional U.S. market. It took a substantial 
subsidy for that sale to be made, i.e., for the EC to be 
able to undercut U.S. wheat producers! 
What can one do to curb the trade distortions of ex-
port subsidies? First, with respect to subsidies designed 
to penetrate one's own market, the solution is relatively 
simple. Countervailing duties can be applied. We have done 
this for both agricultural and non-agricultural products, 
to protect U.S. producers from having their domestic market 
undercut by subsidized competition from abroad. 
Under present U.S. law, "injury" need not be proven in 
such cases. This causes consternation among some of our 
trading partners. But one must ask, where in economic theory 
can a case be built for establishing an injury requirement 
in such cases, particularly when the "subsidizer" is a 
developed nation! 
The more difficult case is the one involving "third 
country subsidies," e.g., the Brazilian sale to which I 
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just alluded. Countervailing duties are of no avail there --
unless the recipient country can be persuaded to countervail, 
which is most unlikely. The consumers of the recipient nation 
will be delighted with the resource transfer represented in 
th~ export subsidy! 
To deal with the third country situation, an export sub-
sidy code undoubtedly will be required. There are a good 
many other trade policy problems in the subsidy-countervailing 
duty area that also merit international attention, i.e., 
inclusion in a code. For this reason, the United States has 
submitted a concepts paper on this subject in Geneva. Though 
negotiations in this area will be extremely difficult and 
sensitive (it will probably be the most contentious issue of 
all in the MTN), they are critical to the success of the 
Tokyo Round. This is one of the most, if not the most, 
significant of the non-tariff trade barriers in use today. 
And it is potentially the most economically distortive of 
all. Therefore, it behooves all of ~s to give subsidy practices 
our attention, both in an academic setting and at the negotia-
ting table. 
A New Challenge -- Supply Access 
Restrictions designed to protect and serve the interest 
of domestic producers have for many years been the major 
challenge faced by trade negotiators. As I have noted, most 
of these restrictions are defensive -- their purpose being 
to keep competitive products out. The exception is export 
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subsidies, which are offensive -- their purpose being to 
develop export markets. 
A new challenge emerged in the clamor over U.S. grain 
sales to the Soviet Union, the challenge of export restric-
tions. Food price increases in the U.S. during 1973 led 
to strong political pressures for export controls. The con-
sumer movement, which had been languishing somewhat after 
its earlier successes on automobile safety, meat inspection, 
etc., suddendly found itself with a new cause. 
Prior to 1973 food had been a tremendous bargain in the 
U.S. The percentage of income expended for food had dropped 
below a mean of 16, for the first time in history, and by 
far the lowest in the world. Relative to the consumers of 
other nations, our food is still a bargain, and has been 
even in the somewhat chaotic days since those 1972 grain 
sales. Nevertheless, as economists we have learned that 
Americans are often less concerned with absolute price 
levels than with the rate of change in those levels. (Witness 
the recent adjustments to a higher level of gasoline prices 
and the return to bigger cars vis-a-vis the consternation 
expressed when gasoline prices began their climb.) 
Dramatic incremental adjustments in food costs during 
1973 certainly caught the attention of American housewives. 
The resultant outcry ultimately (caused at least partially 
by the economic distortions of a price-wage control program) 
led to the imposition of export controls on soybeans. In 
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retrospect, this was not one of the better public policy 
decisions ever made in the U.S.! From the consumer stand-
point, it impacted adversely on our balance of trade, 
weakened the dollar, and thereby made imports more costly. 
From the producer standpoint, it did more damage to our 
reputation as a dependable supplier (i.e., exporter) of 
agricultural products than anything that has happened before 
or since. In addition, it stimulated an enormous investment 
in alternative, and ultimately competitive, sources of supply 
elsewhere, viz. Brazil. 
We are not alone in applying export restrictions. Other 
nations have done so too, for a variety of reasons -- economic, 
foreign policy, national security, or combinations thereof. In 
ferrous scrap, for example, essentially everyone but the U.S. 
applies export controls. 
This issue has stimulated a great deal of discussion in 
international fora. It has become known as the "supply access" 
question. GATT rounds of trade negotiations have to date 
been devoted almost exclusively to "market access." Supply 
access has had little attention, but tensions have been build-
ing and many believe that a comprehensive code of conduct is 
needed. The major stimulus for this concern has, of course, 
come from the OPEC oil cartel. But there is also concern 
about access to food supplies, enhanced by the trend toward 
long term contracting among food exporters and importers 
and the resultant thinning of the world market. 
At the moment no action is underway in Geneva in this 
area. 
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Summary 
In summary, agricultural trade barriers are on the 
front burner of the MTN in Geneva. So long as they are 
negotiated with barriers to non-agricultural products, 
considerable movement toward a "comparative advantage 
world" is possible. As a major actual and potential ex-
porter of farm products, the U.S. should gain from a 
significant reduction and/or elimination of agricultural 
trade barriers. Our producers will benefit directly, our 
consumers indirectly. 
In specific areas of the negotiations, we are hopeful 
that tariff levels will be reduced more than in the Kennedy 
Round. Our own tariff proposal meets that objective. An 
export subsidy-countervailing duty code should emerge at 
the end of a hard fought negotiation. If this does not occur, 
the United States will protect itself domestically through 
its countervailing duty authority, internationally in third 
country subsidy cases through use of the retaliatory provi-
sions of Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. A standards 
code, which could prove to be extremely important to agri-
culture, is likely, as is significant progress on quantitative 
restrictions. The probability of agreement on additional 
codes -- government procurement, safeguards, and supply access 
is difficult to determine at this stage of the negotiating process. 
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Our goal is to wind up the Tokyo Round by the end of 
1977, meaning that the economic benefits of more liberal 
should begin to flow soon thereafter. 
Potential Contributions by the Agricultural Economist 
I would like now to turn briefly to the role that my 
profession might play in international trade policy. Some 
of my comments will be short run nature, i.e., related 
to the MTN; others will have a longer time spectrum. 
First, it is important that we in the U.S. develop more 
trade policy expertise than we have today. We are much too 
thin -- in government, in the academic community, and in the 
private sector -- in people who truly understand international 
trade, and trade policy issues. One of the reasons for this 
is that international trade traditionally has not been all 
that significant to the U.S. economy. Until recently it has 
composed only 4 or 5 percent of Gross National Product. But 
that figure has since doubled, and is likely to move higher 
in the coming years. Export trade is, of course, much more 
significant than that the agricultural sector. 
Another reason for our paucity of international trade talent 
is that GATT negotiations have been conducted on a stop and go, 
round by-round basis. We ve people for each of the 
rounds, particularly in Federal agencies. But then we've 
reduced staffing between rounds, and have lost the benef 
of that training and experience. My hope is that we'll 
rounds of negotiations, and will develop a 
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group of well trained professionals to serve the 
needs of U.S. trade policy as we consult and negotiate with 
our trading partners on a more or less continuous basis. 
Not only are we the professional area, 
but we are also plagued by a level of public knowledge of 
international trade that leaves much to be desired. How 
many of our citizens understand the term "balance of trade?" 
How many can define "countervailing duties?" How many have 
even heard of a "variable levy?" As we expand U.S. involve-
ment in international trade, we have a big educational effort 
ahead if we are to make sound public policy decisions. In 
the agricultural sector, it is you who must inevitably carry 
a large share of that load. 
But let us concentrate now on some of our immediate 
needs. 
First, we need help in the entire area of developed-
developing country relationships. Admittedly, political con-
siderations will play a major role in the evolution of these 
relationships; witness recent meetings of the United Nations 
and its agencies. Nevertheless, we should operate from the 
best possible base of economic theory that we can develop. 
Many volumes have already been written on the develop-
ment process. But the is not very useful a 
negotiating setting. In Geneva, long term ivory tower solu-
tions are of no practical consequence. We need to know how 
we can build "special and differential treatment" for LDCs 
into the drafting of a subsidy code, the implementation 
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a tariff formula, the concept of safeguarding a nation's 
balance of payments. The protection of the interests of 
the U.S. and other developed countries is only one element 
of this need; we must also make sure that what is done for 
the developing countries is not beneficial in the short run, 
detrimental in the long run. 
Among the relevant questions of the day are: "When, 
if ever, should either developed or developing countries be 
permitted under international rules to use export subsidies?" 
"Is maintenance of export earnings, as illustrated, e.g., 
by the Lome Convention, a defensible economic concept?" 
"And what of the desire by developing countries for indexa-
tion of their exports vis-a-vis imports from the developed 
world?'' "How should international trading rules and dispute 
settlement provisions respond to developing country cartels?" 
"How does one define a developing country? s:ro.ould there be 
two or more categories of such countries? If so, where should 
the line be drawn? What are the criteria? When does a nation 
'gratuate' from one development stage to the next, and ulti-
mately to developed status?" "Are there economic tradeoffs 
between price stability and the incentive to produce, i.e., 
are private sector incentives reduced when governments imple-
ment 'stability' programs? It is possible to devise stability 
mechanisms which are not price depressing?" "It is economi-
cally feasible for developing countries to apply import re-
strictions to protect their domestic industries? If so, when? 
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Or should their emphasis be on reducing trade barriers in 
developed countries, rather than creating barriers of their 
own?" "How does one determine the probable international 
competitiveness of a developing country industry? That is, 
how does one decide that the infant industry argument applies?" 
"And on what basis should a developed country {or the develop-
ing country, for that matter) decide, at a later date, that 
the infant industry decision was wrong, and that the industry 
should no longer receive special benefits under international 
rules?" 
These are just a few of a multitude of issues which 
exist today in the trade context of DC-LDC relationships. 
Many more will emerge in the coming years. The trend is 
clearly toward "more trade, less aid," for LDCs. That 
being the case, we need to learn how that trade can best 
be conducted. If there are to be special rules to benefit 
the developing countries -- and this is a foregone conclu-
sion -- then we need to have some imagination in devising 
those rules so that all the world will benefit. Whatever 
be the rules, we need to know their probable economic im-
pact. Today this is a fertile area of interest, but not a 
terribly fertile area of knowledge. 
Second, we need help in defining "injury" in a trade 
policy context and in dealing with the concept of injury in 
trade disputes. One can readily devise dozens of definitions 
for injury, depending on the adjective that is used. One 
might have "material injury," "substantial injury," "significant 
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injury," or any one of a host of other alternatives. Each of 
these terms can, if one is not careful, be interpreted in many 
different ways. 
Injury ought to be an economic concept, not a political 
one. We ought first to determine where in the GATT rules and 
codes proof of injury is even appropriate. The U.S. does 
not now apply an injury test in the application of its 
countervailing duty law, and we are not at all persuaded 
that our law should be changed. If, however, injury might 
appropriately be insisted upon as a prerequisite to certain 
actions taken under the GATT, the definition and interpretation 
of the concept becomes of critical importance. Can one 
adjective serve the needs of all rules and all codes? If 
not, how does one avoid confusion between an injury pro-
vision in a subsidy code which uses one adjective, and a 
similar provision in a safeguards code with a different 
adjective. Add to this the possibility of still another 
definition for developing countries and it is no wonder 
that one of the needs in the GATT is for an improved dispute 
settlement procedure! If economists can help us to make 
sense of the injury question, we will be eternally grateful. 
Third, we need to learn a lot more about the implica-
tions of floating exchange rates to trade policy. For 
example, should nations now be precluded from using trade 
measures to rectify balance of payments deficits? ·will not 
floating exchange rates do the job, thereby avoiding the use 
of trade restrictions which distort international economic 
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relationships? Or is there likely to be a lag involved with 
floating, such that trade measures will still be needed? 
Should trade measures then be more carefully circumscribed 
in their time frame, so that floating rates will take over 
the balancing job as quickly as possible? And what of "dirty 
float?" Though this may lead to increased stability in ex-
change rates, will it not also prevent some of the benefits 
of cleim floating from being fully realized? And what of the 
nations which maintain a fixed exchange rate relationship 
with some countries, but float vis-a-vis others? How can 
their situation be meshed into the GATT rules of the future? 
Finally, how can we do a better job of coordinating monetary 
and trade policy internationally? 
The era of floating exchange rates is just beginning to 
unfold. It is imperative that we quickly and comprehensively 
study and evaluate the economic impact of floating, and apply 
what we learn in the development of U.S. and international 
trade policy. This is an area in which sophisticated economic 
analysis can have a very great payoff. 
Fourth, we badly need updated estimates of price and 
income elasticities for all significant U.S. exports and im-
ports. Present data is simply inadequate. It is unfortunate 
that we must go into a negotiation as important as the Tokyo 
Round, with billions of dollars of international trade at 
stake, and be dependent upon elasticity estimates that are 
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obsolete and of dubious accuracy. Elasticity estimates are 
relevant to every phase of the negotiations -- to determine 
the probable impact of a given tariff formula, to evaluate 
the effect of excepting a particular product from the 
application of that formula, to appraise probable trade 
flows that will emerge from granting LDCs a given type of 
special and differential treatment, etc. If U.S. agricul-
tural economists can provide our negotiators with improved 
elasticity estimates in the future, it will be of very great 
benefit to all. 
Fifth, we live in a country in which private enterprise 
has been the bulwark of our economic development. This is 
especially true in agriculture, where we have long been at 
the head of the class in both production practices and mar-
keting techniques. 
Our market oriented system has served us well. Yet the 
trend elsewhere in the world seems often to be in the other 
direction. Government planners typically want to manage the 
economy. One constantly hears the refrain, "The market system 
just won't work for us." Or, "The free market is a thing of 
the past." But must it be! Cannot we, as U.S. agricultural 
economists, provide a private sector alternative that will 
serve the agricultural needs of other nations? Can we not 
show them the benefits of private incentives, as reflected 
by the performance of U.S. farmers? For example, would it 
not be beneficial to point out the dramatic way in which 
American farmers shift their cropping practices in response 
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to ce s s, and alter their livestock operations for 
the same reason? Could we not, for example, describe the 
workings of U.S. futures markets and the potential they have 
for stabilizing prices of given commodities -- in the 
aggregate and for an individual producer or processor? 
Might this not be a viable alternative, for a good many 
commodities at least, to much more costly buffer stock 
schemes? 
Technical assistance is, of course, an important aspect 
of all of this. If U.S. agricultural economists have some-
thing worthwhile to say to the rest of the world, and parti-
cularly to the developing countries which are so much in 
need, it will have to be said primarily through technical 
assistance programs. We've done a lot in this area, perhaps 
more than any other developed country in the world. But we've 
only scratched the surface. Though we have generally embarked 
upon technical assistance efforts out of humanitarian motives, 
those efforts have usually turned out to be in our self interest. 
As we have taught farmers in other countries to produce more, 
the total development process of those countries has accelerated. 
This has made them better customers for our industrial goods, 
and likewise better customers for U.S. agricultural exports 
as they upgrade their diets by expanding livestock and poultry 
production. Hence, with an effective technical assistance 
program, the recipient country gains, and we gain. Should we 
not then have a much stronger commitment to such endeavors, 
both in our nation as a whole, among our academic institutions? 
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Conclusion 
One could go on with many other examples of economic work 
for which there is a dire need in the trade policy arena. I 
have cited only a few in which present deficiencies are parti-
cularly glaring. There is much to do if we are to make sound 
public policy decisions in this area, decisions that will 
advance the cause of American agriculture. I know that you 
have both the talent and the enthusiasm to undertake this 
most important task. Thank you. 
